Science, spirit, superstition / Constantin Brunner: p. 182-185.

The difference between the right and the wrong concept of causality is, briefly, that of conceiving the cause as relative, identical with motion, or as absolute. To elaborate: the relative cause or motion is that which in its turn is also caused; it is concatenated with all the other motions of the universe, it is a moment (momentum, i.e. movimentum) of general motion. An absolute cause would be a causeless or unmoved cause or motion which cannot exist. Thingly motion is moved within itself and is infinite; we must not seek an explanation outside of it. Scientifically justified is alone the inquiry after the hypothetical proto-matter, or rather the assumption of it in order to facilitate the construction of the theory of motion which furnishes us with an explanation for all specific thingly phenomena and for all change. Not justified is to go in quest of temporal origin and its originator. We can think thingly motion only as existing, never as originated. Whatever distance we may cover in going back from one cause or motion to another, further and further back, we will always remain within causality or within motion. Therefore we cannot lift ourselves ever higher and higher aloft, as so beautifully held out to us in superstitious philosophizing, until we reach an ultimate, absolute, uncaused or unmoved cause or motion (primus motor). One cannot climb up the Jacob's ladder of causes or motions right into the bosom of the quiescent good Lord. It is the confounding of the faculties; relativity is raised to absoluteness and, of course, a fictitious absolute is conceived.

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But generally the explanation through God is now only brought up when the entire world of things is treated of—for thoughtlessness is the bigger, the bigger the nexus is that is to be thought about. To tell that a hen's egg had originated from the void would not be considered reasonable. But if it is said that the world had been fashioned out of a vacuum—well it cannot be denied that on this subject many people have been, and still are, very devout. And not otherwise when one puts it to them that the world originated from the world. They would not entertain this as a world-origin. But if one uses the word: chaos, telling them that this chaos was so tenuous—a hundred thousand times more so than hydrogen—so that in practice it was just like no world at all, and that from this the world had sprung, then there will be no lack of people who regard this a real world origin.